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Abstract In several developed countries, the ageing process of the population may
pose fiscal risks to the PAYG systems of public pensions. This paper studies the
determinants of two forms of accessing retirement in Spain, either partial or full
retirement. Our goal is to identify if social security legislation influences the choice
between these two alternative paths. Using a newly released data set we estimate a
multinomial logit duration model including different measures capturing the eco-
nomic incentives embedded in the social security system. Our results show that
social security incentives determine individual retirement decisions. Besides, partial
retirement legislation modifies the selection of retirement routes and affects the age
of retirement moving it to an earlier date.
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1 Introduction
Several developed countries may face fiscal risks stemming from the lack of
financial sustainability of their pay-as-you-go (PAYG) public pension systems. Two
major trends are behind this, the ageing process of the population—due to the
This paper is a revised version of my Master’s Thesis presented in partial fulfillment of the 2005–2007
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increase in life expectancy at birth and the decline in fertility rates—and the
shortening of professional lifes, also driven by the increase in early retirement. All
these elements have implications for the evolution of the labour force structure and
on the dependency ratio which is a key determinant to the viability of PAYG
systems—such as the spanish one. For this reason, it is important to understand
which factors influence retirement decisions.
The effect that the social security system has upon the observed behaviour is
essential. A wide range of worldwide studies have tried to assess the quantitative
importance of these effects. Blondal and Scarpetta (1998) and Gruber and Wise
(1999, 2004) have suggested that individual retirement decisions are strongly
affected by the design of the social security system. Bo¨rsch-Supan (2000) argues
that workers have responded consistently and strongly to the economic incentives to
retire earlier in Germany. Gruber and Wise (1999), for the case of Spain, find
evidence that the social security legislation generates strong incentives to retire
early and the main inducement comes from the generous mechanism determining
the minimum pension, specially for low earners. With the aim of changing the
retirement incentives of older workers, the spanish government launched a reform of
the pension system in 1997 and an amendment to it in 2002. Partial retirement, as a
form of accessing pension benefits, was regulated in Spain in 2002.1 The objective
of this regulation was making the access to retirement a more flexible process,
avoiding a sharp break between working and retirement. Since then, the use of
partial retirement as a form of entering retirement has dramatically increased.
Therefore, it is relevant to know if the legislation of partial retirement modifies
retirement patterns towards postponing the age of definitely exiting the labour force
participation—and thus incrementing activity rates of older people—or if it is
actually creating incentives to advance retirement. For this, understanding the
determinants of partial retirement is an important step. It is hoped that the non-
applicability of reduction coefficients in case of partial retirement before the age of
65 is a potential source of making this exit route a dominant strategy against early
retirement, at least at an early age.
Different studies have tried to understand the determinants of many possible
exit routes from employment available in Spain. Older workers use either early
retirement, ordinary retirement, temporary illness or disability or temporary leave
from the labour force as pathways to a situation of non-participation. Blanco
(2000) studies, using the Spanish Household Panel Survey, two alternative routes
for entering retirement in Spain: pure early retirement or disability. Boldrin et al.
(1999, 2004) assess the role that social security incentives are playing on early
retirement decision, using a random draw from the administrative records from the
Spanish Social Security Administration. Argimo´n et al. (2009) carried out a
similar analysis estimating a duration model and computing the effects of
the reform that took place in 2002, using the Continuous Sample of Working
Histories (Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales, MCVL). Jime´nez-Martı´n and
1 The regulation comes through the Law 35/2002. However, the figure of partial retirement is present in
the Spanish Social Security System since 1994, when the General Social Security Act (Ley General de la
Seguridad Social) was promulgated.
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Vall-Castello´ (2009) analyze transitions from employment to unemployment,
disability pensions and inactivity of spanish workers aged 45–59 incorporating
business cycle indicators. However, the possible differential pattern between
partial and full retirement has not yet been analysed in Spain mainly because of
two reasons: the practically nonexistent use of partial retirement before 2002 and
the absence of detailed microeconometric data. The MCVL allows to precisely
identify partial retirement.
Therefore, the aim of this study is to identify the determinants of two forms of
accessing pension benefits by men aged between 60 and 65 in Spain: either
partial or full retirement. Special interest is devoted both to assess the
explanatory power of different measures capturing the economic incentives
embedded in the social security system into the alternative retirement routes and
to identify if these incentives can influence the choice between them. It is of
main interest to know what drives retirement decisions in order to design suitable
policies. The idea is that if a policy whose aim is to retain old workers at work
is not well designed, it will create greater incentives to leave earlier the
contributory life.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 a summary of the spanish
social security legislation is provided. Section 3 describes the econometric
specification. Section 4 offers a description of the data set and presents the social
security incentives. Section 5 shows the estimation results. Finally, Sect. 6
concludes.
2 Institutional features: retirement rules
This section briefly describes the rules governing retirement systems in Spain since
1997 and the 2002 amendment. Given that the objective is to analyze the retirement
decision in ages ranging from 60 to 65, we focus only on the corresponding
legislation. For a complete description of the spanish social security system see
Boldrin et al. (2004).
Spain has a mandatory PAYG system where pension benefits are mainly
provided under two schemes: General Social Security System (Re´gimen General de
la Seguridad Social, RGSS) and Special Social Security System (Regı´menes
Especiales de la Seguridad Social, RESS). The General Regime is a pure PAYG
system and it is the one with the greatest percentage of covered workers.
Specifically, 77% of workers were covered by the RGSS in 2005, the year of
extraction of the data used in the analysis. This study focuses only on that system.
Qualifying to receive an old-age benefit is conditional on several requirements. The
main ones are the attainment of a specified age and a minimum period of
contribution and total or substantial withdrawal from the labour force, if the
participation requires the worker to contribute to the system. Regarding to the
minimum period of contributions, entitlement to an old age pension requires at least
15 years of contributions, two of them within the 15 years immediately previous to
the time of becoming eligible to the benefit. The following two alternative routes for
entering retirement are considered:
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• Full retirement. An individual can fully retire through three different paths:
ordinary retirement, early retirement and special retirement at the age of 64. The
ordinary retirement age is 65. For those who started contributing to the system
after 1967 and since the 2002 amendment, early retirement at age 61 is
permitted with strict requirements. Namely, they have to (a) certify a minimum
effective contribution period of 30 years, (b) be registered as a job seeker, in the
public employment service offices, during a period of 6 months immediately
prior to the date of the retirement application and (c) the job termination should
not been caused by worker’s free will. Early retirement at age 60 is permitted (if
the minimum period of contributions is satisfied), according to the rules of a
transient law, for those who contributed to labour mutual funds that preceded the
establishment of the social security system. The amount of all early retirement
pensions are subject to reduction coefficients. Finally, retirement at 64 years,
certifying the minimum period of contributions, is possible if the firm hires
another worker for a minimum period of 1 year to replace the retiree. In this
latter case the retiree is eligible to full benefits and no reduction coefficients are
applied.
• Partial retirement. An employee who has reached the age of 60 and meets the
entitlement conditions required to earn the right to the contributory social
security retirement pension, may apply for partial retirement. The worker must
arrange, by agreement with the firm, a part-time contract that reduces the
working day and salary by a minimum of 25% and a maximum of 85% each. If
the worker applies for partial retirement at an age less than 65 the firm will
arrange a simultaneous relief contract, in order to fill the working day left vacant
by the partially retired worker. In cases in which the worker applies for partial
retirement at the age of 65 or older, it is not necessary to arrange a relief contract
provided that the other requirements are met. Relief and part-time contracts are
strictly regulated by law.
When eligibility conditions are satisfied, the initial pension a retired individual is
going to receive is determined by applying a percentage called the replacement rate
(at) to the regulating base (RBt) as shown in expression (1).
Pt ¼ atRBt ð1Þ
The regulating base is, since 2002 and as expressed in (2), a weighted average of the
contribution bases2 (Bt) in the 180 months prior to retirement, that is 15 years of
contributory life.3 Before 1997 the number of years of reference was only eight.
Starting from 1997, this number increased by 1 year until 2001, reaching 15 in
2002.
2 Bases of the contribution are a doubly censored version of monthly earnings. Lower and upper ceilings
are legislated annually and depend on the contributive group.
3 The legislation gives a rule of gap integration in case there are months when the worker had no
obligation to make contributions. These contribution gaps will be integrated with the minimum
contribution bases in the RGSS for workers over 18 years of age. Note also that, as pensions are paid
fourteen times during a year, expression (2) is divided by 210.














where It corresponds to the consumer price index (CPI) at period t.
The replacement rate depends on the number of years of contribution to the
system (n) and on the age of the retiree (a). In case of ordinary retirement
at ¼
0 if n\15
0:5 þ 0:03ðn  15Þ if 15 n 25
0:8 þ 0:02ðn  25Þ if 25\n\35




In case of early retirement, there is a reduction coefficient (k) for each age previous
to the ordinary age of retirement. The scheme of penalization was modified in the




1  kð65  aÞ if 61 a\65
1 if a 65
8
<
: where k ¼
0:080 if n ¼ 30
0:075 if 31 n 34
0:070 if 35 n 37
0:065 if 38 n 39




Before the 2002 amendment the replacement rate in case of early retirement was
at ¼
0 if a\60
0:60 þ 0:08ða  60Þ if 60 a\65 and n\40
0:65 þ 0:07ða  60Þ if 60 a\65 and n 40




The 2002 legislation introduced a premium for late retirement, so that
at ¼ 1 þ 0:02ða  65Þ if a [ 65 and n 35
In case of partial retirement, reduction coefficients are not applied when the worker
retires before reaching the age of 65. Moreover, the resulting pension amount is
reduced by the working day reduction percentage.
Contributory social security pensions are subject to minimum and maximum
ceilings legislated annually. Other things being equal, minimum pensions are higher
for those who are older than 65 and/or have a dependent spouse. Furthermore, all
pensions, including minimum pensions, are revalued at the beginning of each year
based on the CPI forecast for that year. If the cumulative CPI is greater than the
forecast CPI used to calculate the revaluation, an appropriate update is made.
3 Econometric model
The approach used to model retirement decisions is not a structural represen-
tation of the choice between partial and full retirement. The retirement decision
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is in fact modelled using a reduced-form approach, as in Gruber and Wise
(2004), and no labour demand considerations are taken into account. An
alternative approach is the option value developed by Stock and Wise (1990), in
which a representative agent considers the flow of expected future utilities to
continue working against retirement. Particularly, the retirement decision of the
individual is affected not only by retirement benefits, but also by the future
evolution of work and wealth. Another alternative approach is to consider a full
life-cycle model, which an example for the spanish case is developed by
Jime´nez-Martı´n and Sa´nchez-Martı´n (2007). For simplicity, this paper follows a
hazard rate approach to capture the effects of personal characteristics,
contributory life characteristics and social security incentives on the path to
enter retirement. Following Bover and Go´mez (2004), we consider a model in
which there is more than one possible exit from full time labour force
participation or equivalently in our context, more than one possible entry to
retirement: either partially or fully. We assume that individuals will choose to
not retire if the utility of remaining in their current situation is greater than the
utility of retiring, either fully or partially. If we have a discrete duration variable
T and two alternatives represented by the indicators DF and DP, where F and P
identify full and partial retirement respectively, we can define the following
intensities of transition to each of the states:
/FðtÞ ¼ PrðT ¼ t; DF ¼ 1jT  tÞ
/PðtÞ ¼ PrðT ¼ t; DP ¼ 1jT  tÞ
In our context, T represents the duration of a situation of non-retirement and /F(t) is
the probability of exiting to full retirement at T = t among those who remain non-
retired for at least T C t periods. Equivalently, /P(t) is the probability of exiting to
partial retirement at T = t among those who remain non-retired for at least T C t
periods. So, the hazard rate from a situation of non-retirement is given by:
/ðtÞ ¼ /FðtÞ þ /PðtÞ
As pointed out by different authors (Narendranathan and Stewart 1993a, b; Sueyoshi
1995; Jenkins 1995) a discrete duration model can be regarded as a sequence of
discrete choice models—with cross-equation restrictions—defined on the surviving
population at each duration. This provides a useful perspective for computational
reasons that can be easily understood firstly by introducing a sequence of exit
indicators at t to a given alternative:
YFt ¼ 1 T ¼ t; DF ¼ 1ð Þ; YPt ¼ 1 T ¼ t; DP ¼ 1ð Þ for t ¼ 1; 2; 3; . . .
According to this notation,
/FðtÞ ¼ PrðYFt ¼ 1jT  tÞ
/PðtÞ ¼ PrðYPt ¼ 1jT  tÞ
Alternatively, we can define exit rates to each of the states conditional upon not
exiting to the alternative state:
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hFðtÞ ¼ PrðYFt ¼ 1jT  t; YPt ¼ 0Þ
hPðtÞ ¼ PrðYFt ¼ 1jT  t; YFt ¼ 0Þ
So, hF(t) is the probability of exiting to full retirement at T = t among those who
remain non-retired for at least T C t periods and do not exit to partial retirement at
T = t. Equivalently, hP(t) is the probability of exiting to partial retirement at T = t
among those who remain non-retired for at least T C t periods and do not exit to full
retirement at T = t.
The relationship with the previous transition intensities is given by:
hFðtÞ ¼ PrðYFt ¼ 1jT  tÞ






Therefore, in the context of variables and multiple exit alternatives, we can choose
between modelling the intensities /j(t) or the conditional hazard rates hj(t). The
models for the conditional probabilities are usually called competing risk models.
This name derives from the fact that if we consider the existence of two latent
duration variables T1
* and T2





* are independent, then the conditional exit rates can be interpreted as exit
rates for the latent durations:
h1ðtÞ ¼ PrðT1 ¼ tjT1  tÞ
h2ðtÞ ¼ PrðT2 ¼ tjT2  tÞ
That is, to analyze exits to alternative 1 we take the exits to alternative 2 as censored
observations, and vice versa. Note that irrespective of whether T1
*, T1
* correspond to
well defined concepts, h1(t), h2(t) generally represent useful descriptive character-
istics for the durations and exits observed.
We use the multinomial logit model, a specification commonly used in multiple
choice problems. Consequently, the dependence of /F(t) and /P(t) on the








1 þ ex0bF þ ex0bP
Note that, in accordance with the relationships given above, this specification for
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So, if the transition intensities are modelled as multinomial logit, the conditional
exit rates are binary logit with the same parameters. As a result, the use of the
logistic specification leads to the same model in both cases.
The method used to obtain the estimation of the parameters of the logistic
specification (bF, bP) is conditional maximum likelihood. The conditional log-





ci DFi log hFi dið Þ þ DFi
Xdi1
t¼1
log 1  hFi tð Þð Þ
 !"
þ DPi þ ð1  ciÞ½ 
Xdi
t¼1
log 1  hFi tð Þð Þ
#
where di is the observed duration and ci is a censoring indicator which takes the
value 1 if the entry to retirement is observed, and 0 if it is not.
That is, the conditional maximum likelihood estimators defined as the
maximisers of LF(bF) and LP(bP), respectively, can be obtained as separate
maximum-likelihood estimates of both binary logit models. It is important to note
that in LF(bF) the exits to partial retirement are treated as censored observations.
Having obtained estimates of the parameters bF, bP we can obtain different
measures of the effect of the explanatory variables on the probabilities of choosing a
specific retirement route depending on whether /j(t) or hj(t) are the focus of the
analysis.
4 Data and empirical analysis
4.1 Data set
The empirical analysis of the retirement decision is based on the Continuous Sample
of Working Histories (Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales, MCVL) wave 2005. It
is an administrative data set based on a random draw from the Spanish Social
Security records. It contains a sample of 4% of the population of reference which is
formed by all the individuals that at any time during 2005 were either contributing
towards the social security system or perceiving a contributory pension. Contrib-
utory pensions include: old-age pensions, disability pensions, widowhood pensions,
orphanage pensions and family pensions. The data set provides information about
the entire labour history of workers, for instance the exact duration of each
employment and unemployment spells, the firm’s sector of activity, the type of
contract held, the wages measured as contribution bases, etc. The MCVL is
particularly attractive for the study of retirement behaviour because it contains the
main parameters to calculate pension rights. For pensioners, the data set offers
detailed information about the type of pension received. Personal characteristics as
age, gender, nationality, level of education, etc. are also collected. For a full
description of the data set see MTAS (2006).
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As the objective of the paper is to analyze transitions from a situation of non-
retirement into retirement, either partial or full, in ages ranging from 60 to 65,
neither transitions from partial retirement to full retirement nor transitions from full
retirement to flexible retirement4 are studied. Thus, we focus on the first transition
into retirement and if the partial retirement route is chosen, we assume for simplicity
that the final age to enter full retirement is exogenously fixed. Therefore, an
individual is considered fully retired if she starts receiving a contributory pension
stemming from either early retirement, special retirement at the age of 64 or
ordinary retirement, and is considered partially retired in case of starting perceiving
a contributory pension stemming from partial retirement. The use of administrative
data has the main advantage of avoiding relying on self-reported information, which
might suffer from measurement error, or on arbitrary definitions of partial
retirement based upon labour market activity, as for example the number of hours
worked per week used in Sueyoshi (1989).
The study is restricted to individuals between 60 and 68 years old in 2005 (i.e.
born between 1937 and 1945), with working records in the RGSS and not retired
before they are 60. The reasons are that we are only interested in retirement
decisions in ages between 60 and 65 and that data on contributive pensions is only
well recorded after 1996. So, we focus on individuals aged 60 or more between
1997 and 2005, the year of extraction of the data set used in the analysis. Moreover,
as marital status is not known we do not examine the retirement decision in a
household framework and we decided to restrict the analysis to men. Our sample
contains 51,329 individuals, 23,379 of which enter retirement between 60 and
65 years old. The rest of individuals are censored, either because we observe them
up to a certain age, because we do not observe them retire or because they do it after
Table 1 Distribution of individuals. If censored, broken down by age in 2005 and if retired, broken
down by type and age of initial retirement
Age
Censored Fully retired Partially retired
Number % Number % Number %
60 6,607 23.64 8,309 39.05 1,333 63.48
61 5,660 20.25 1,547 7.27 340 16.19
62 5,334 19.08 1,525 7.17 258 12.29
63 4,134 14.79 1,285 6.04 106 5.05
64 3,277 11.72 1,832 8.61 22 1.05
65 1,904 6.81 6,781 31.87 41 1.95
Greater than 65 1,034 3.70
Total 27,950 100 21,279 100 2,100 100
Individuals are censored either because we observe them up to a certain age, because we do not observe
them retire or because they do it after the age of 65
4 The situation of flexible retirement is the possibility of making the full retirement pension compatible,
once in effect, with a part-time contract. This figure was introduced in the 2002 amendment.
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the age of 65. Table 1 shows the distribution of individuals: if censored, broken
down by age in 2005 and if retired, broken down by type and age of initial
retirement. As it can be seen, the use of partial retirement as a form of accessing
pension benefits is not as extended as early retirement.
As shown in Table 1, the majority of individuals who partially retire do it at 60,
the first year in which older workers have the option to partially retire, and the
majority of individuals who fully retired do it before the ordinary age of retirement.
Major differences between the two risks become apparent when observing the
empirical hazard rates presented in Figs. 1 and 2. It is necessary to point out the
important difference in the magnitude as well as in the shape of the hazard rates to
the two types of exits. In the case of full retirement we observe two spikes, one at 60
and a more pronounced one at the ordinary age of retirement, whereas in the case of
partial retirement we only observe one spike at 60. This evidence is consistent with
the hypothesis that the underlying determinants of the two forms of retirement paths
are potentially different.
The variables that are taken into account include personal characteristics,
contributory life characteristics and social security incentives which are introduced
in the next section. See Appendix for a description of the rest of the variables.
We cannot take fully into account some determinants of the retirement decision
because the information was not collected in the data set. First of all, there is no
information about health status. Poor health is expected to change preferences and
should have, a priori, a positive impact upon retirement probabilities. As the data set
includes information about disability pensions, we use the receipt of this pensions as
a control for poor health. The idea is to take into account that health could be one of
the primary determinants of retirement age. Secondly, the data set is relatively poor
in information about the role that firms play in retirement decisions. It is reasonable
to think that retirement choices depend on firm’s action. This is particularly true in
the case of partial retirement before the age of 65, given that the worker has to reach
an agreement with the firm in order to arrange a relief contract. The absence of a


















Fig. 1 Empirical hazard rate to full retirement
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security incentives on retirement decisions. Finally, there is no information of other
sources of wealth, neither private pension plans nor non-labour income. However,
the level of education and the sector of activity could capture, even through an
indirect way, part of their effect.
4.2 Evaluation of social security incentives
To properly evaluate the economic incentives embedded in the social security
system the approach adopted by Boldrin et al. (2004) is followed with some new
definitions considering partial retirement. We express the incentives in monetary
terms rather than in utility terms. This approach has the advantage that the results
are not affected by assumptions concerning the difference in utility between partial
and full retirement pensions. For an individual of age a, we firstly define social
security wealth (SSW) in case of full retirement at age h C a as the expected present







where S is the certain age of death, qs = b
s-aps, with b denoting the pure time
discount factor and ps the conditional probability for an individual aged a to be alive
at age s, and Ps
F(h) the annual pension expected at age s C h ? 1 in case of full
retirement at age h.
We can also define SSW for a worker who decides to partially retire at age h C a
and remain in that situation until age b [ h C a, when the individual finally fully


























Fig. 2 Empirical hazard rate to partial retirement
SERIEs (2010) 1:325–356 335
123
where Ps
P(h) is the annual pension expected at age s C h ? 1 in case of partial
retirement at age h and Ps
FP(b, h) is the annual pension expected at age
s C b ? 1 [ h C a in case of partial retirement at age h and then enter full
retirement at age b. Note that the worker spends (b - h) periods in a situation of
partial retirement before entering full retirement at age b. It is worth noting that the
individual is going to make one joint decision: the age of retirement h and the
retirement path, whether fully or partially.
Given SSWj, where the superscript j identifies the retirement route, full (F) or
partial (P), let us define three incentive variables for an individual of age a.
1. The social security accrual (SSA) is the difference in SSW from postponing
retirement from age a to age a ? 1
(a) in case of full retirement:






s ða þ 1Þ  PFs ðaÞ
  qaþ1PFaþ1 að Þ
The SSAF is positive if the expected present value of the increment in the flow





s ða þ 1Þ  PFs ðaÞ
 
is greater than the expected present value of the full pension benefit foregone
by postponing, one single period, full retirement, that is qa?1Pa?1
F (a). If the
increments Ps
F(a ? 1) - Ps
F(a) are small then the SSAF is negative. The re-
scaled negative accrual sa
F = - SSAa
F/Wa?1, where Wa?1 equals expected
earnings at age a ? 1 based on the information available up to age a, is called
the implicit tax/subsidy on postponing full retirement from age a to age
a ? 1. The intuition behind this measure is that a negative accrual can be
interpreted as a tax on further labour force participation. We therefore
compute as an implicit tax rate the ratio of the (negative) accrual to the wage
that workers would earn if they postponed full retirement at age a. As pointed
out by Dekkers (2007), the advantage of using the implicit tax rate over the
SSA is that it has no scale, and therefore is suitable for comparisons between
groups of individuals.
(b) in case of partial retirement, and in an analogous way,
SSAPa ¼ SSWPaþ1  SSWPa
where
















































s ðb; a þ 1Þ  PFPs ðb; aÞ
  qaþ1PPaþ1ðaÞ
Again, we define sa
P = - SSAa
P/Wa?1 as the implicit tax/subsidy on postpon-
ing partial retirement from age a to age a ? 1. The SSAP is positive if the
expected present value of the increment in the flow of both partial and full











s ðb; a þ 1Þ  PFPs ðb; aÞ
 
is greater than the expected present value of the partial pension benefit
foregone, qa?1Pa?1
P (a), by postponing partial retirement one period, from age a
to age a ? 1.
2. The peak value (Coile and Gruber 2000) is the maximum difference in SSW
between retiring at any future age h and retiring at age a. This measure captures
the tradeoff between retiring today and working until a period with much higher
SSW. This measure assumes a less myopic behaviour by the individual than
SSA because it considers the potential gain in SSW resulting from delaying
retirement not only 1 year, but also the gains that may be derived from retiring
in any subsequent year. Therefore, it takes into account that an additional year
of work sustains the option of retiring at an even later date. Note that the peak
value is equal to the SSA if the peak of the SSW process is attained with
immediate retirement.





; h ¼ a þ 1; . . .; R
where R is the maximum full retirement age allowed fixed exogenously.





; h ¼ a þ 1; . . .; b
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where b B R is the age of full retirement.
3. The delta social security wealth (DSSW) is the difference between SSW in case
of partial retirement at age a and SSW in case of full retirement at age a
DSSWa ¼ SSWPa  SSWFa
This measure gives us an assessment about how much partial retirement beats full
retirement in terms of SSW. It is important to note that the non-applicability of
reduction coefficients in case of partial retirement before the age of 65 is a potential
source of making this exit route a dominant strategy against early retirement, at least
at an early age.
4.3 Basic assumptions in the calculation of social security incentives
In order to compute pension rights it is important to know which individuals have
started contributing to the system before 1967 because the elegibility requirements
up to 64 are different as already mentioned in Sect. 2. An important limitation of the
data set used is that only a part of the details describing the relations taking place
before 1966 are electronically recorded. Hence, the data set is incomplete in terms
of the number of social security relations collected at least for those individuals who
started contributing to the system before 1966. Pension rights have been calculated
as if all individuals had the condition of membership in a labour mutual society
before 1967. The reason is that as we focus on individuals born between 1937 and
1945, in ages ranging from 22 to 30 in 1967, all of them had the potential to have
contributed to labour mutual funds that preceded the establishment of the social
security system.5 The main consequence of this assumption is that for those
individuals who started their real contributory life after 1967, the satisfaction of the
minimum period of contributions before 64 is not sufficient to claim for an old-age
pension.6
Calculation of SSW and related incentive measures depends crucially on the
following elements: the legislation which applies at each moment in time, the
individual history of contributions, the consumer price index, minimum and
maximum contribution bases, minimum and maximum retirement pensions and
mortality tables.
We presume that, at each age, workers perfectly know the rules governing the
social security system and that they perfectly anticipate legislated changes that are
known to take effect in the future, e.g. the gradual increment on the number of years
of contribution used to compute the regulating base since 1997. To avoid the
5 Although the INE (Instituto Nacional de Estadı´stica) does not provide separate data on high level
education by age groups, only 147,233 individuals were enrolled in superior studies in 1967. For more
details see INE (1968).
6 Although this assumption, we observe 835 individuals who start perceiving a contributory pension and
do not satisfy the minimum period of contributions. We decided to eliminate these individuals of the
analysis as the available information was not sufficient to calculate their SSW and related incentive
measures.
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complications due to changes over time in the income tax schedule, we present
calculations before income taxes.
Computing social security incentives requires considering forecasts for future
contribution bases so we assume that real contribution bases are constant after the
last year of observed bases for each individual. To smooth idiosyncratic noise,
contribution bases projections are taken as the average of the last 3 years of
observed bases as done in Brugiavini et al. (2003).
The age of certain death is fixed to 100, the most recent available mortality tables
for men from INE (Instituto Nacional de Estadı´stica 1999) are used and we assume a
time discount factor b equal to 0.97 as in Boldrin et al. (2004). As already
mentioned, minimum pensions depend on family considerations. We assume that all
individuals had a dependent spouse.
To calculate SSW in case of partial retirement we assume, for simplicity, that
each individual who partially retires between ages 60 and 65 enters full retirement at
66. An step forward this assumption would be to make this decision endogenous.
That is, to consider that the exit route through partial retirement is the result of a
joint decision: when partially retire and when exiting completely the labour market
through full retirement. We also abstract from a joint choice between partial
retirement and postretirement hours of work and consider that partial retirement
implies a part-time contract of 15% of the working day, the minimum permitted by
law. In the sample, we observe more than 80% of individuals who partially retire
reducing their working day by the maximum of 85%. As we restrict the analysis of
retirement behaviour in ages ranging from 60 to 65, we consider that the maximum
full retirement age allowed is R = 66.
Tables 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 in Appendix present descriptive statistics (mean,
standard deviation and selected percentiles) for the different incentives measures.7
As can be seen in Table 10, the mean of SSAF is positive except for the age of
65. That is, continuing to work at ages 60–64, instead of fully retiring, comes with
a gain in terms of SSW. Equivalently, there is an implicit subsidy (negative
implicit tax) on postponing 1 year full retirement between 60 and 64, as can be
observed in Table 11. On the contrary, at the age of 65 there is an implicit tax on
further labour force participation. In the case of partial retirement, the tax on
continue working arrives at an earlier age. Moreover, the mean peak value
decreases with age and eventually becomes negative both in case of full and
partial retirement, as can be seen in Table 12. This means that the gain in terms of
SSW resulting from delaying retirement until a period with much higher SSW
fades with age, and more rapidly in case of partial retirement. The analysis of the
different incentives measures goes in favour of the idea outlined in the
introduction: the non-applicability of reduction coefficients in case of partial
retirement before the age of 65 is a potential source of making this exit route a
dominant strategy against early retirement.
7 Additional descriptive statistics are available upon request.
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5 Results
We estimate the influence of individual and contributory life characteristics and
social security incentives on the hazard of entering retirement, either fully or
partially. The estimation results are presented in Tables 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and in Figs. 3,
4, 5, 6.8 We discuss the qualitative impacts of the variables included in the analysis
on the conditional hazard rates by studying the sign and statistical significance of the
estimated coefficients. The dependence of the hazard rate on the time spent in a
situation of non-retirement is captured through duration dummies, through duration
dummies interacted with a dummy variable indicating at each duration if the
individual achieved the minimum period of contribution and through the interaction
of the explanatory variables with the logarithm of the duration to account for possible
different effects of independent variables at different ages. We chose not to restrict
the analysis to people who satisfy the minimum period of contributions at the age of
60, for example, although we control for the satisfaction of this requirement through
dummy variables. It is thought that a potentially different behaviour could arise
between individuals who are entitled at 60 and individuals who are entitled at 63,
due, for example, to the non-linear application of reduction coefficients.
5.1 The impact of social security wealth and social security accrual
Table 2 presents the results of the estimation by conditional maximum likelihood.9
In addition to personal and contributory life characteristics, in columns 1a and 1b
the only regressor introduced capturing social security regulation is social security
wealth. In columns 2a and 2b, aside from the same variables presented in columns
1a and 1b, social security accrual is included. Both specifications are satisfactory in
terms of explaining variability in the data measured through the pseudo R2
statistic.10 The specification with both SSW and SSA is the preferred one. Before
analysing the effect of the different variables, it is necessary to point out the
important difference in the magnitude and shape of the predicted hazard rates to the
two forms of accessing pension benefits, see Figs. 3 and 4.
As it can be seen in columns 2a and 2b of Table 2, each measure of SSW has a
significant positive impact on its own hazard rate while a significant negative impact
on the hazard rate of the alternative risk. Particularly, the SSW in case of full
retirement (SSWF) has a positive effect on the hazard rate to full retirement that
lessens over time, while a negative one on the hazard rate to partial retirement. The
8 The results are robust to the inclusion of measures of business cycle effects (either time dummies or
GDP growth). The estimation results are not reported but are available upon request.
9 The conditional maximum likelihood provides consistent and asymptotically normal estimates of the
parameters. Moreover, its computation is faster. However, a joint estimation has also been performed,
given that the joint estimation of the parameters is asymptotically more efficient. The results obtained by
joint maximum likelihood do not significantly differ from the ones obtained by conditional maximum
likelihood. The results are available upon request.
10 The pseudo R2 in a non-reported model without incentive measures is equal to 0.3520 and 0.2045 in
case of full and partial retirement, respectively. Note that there is a substantial increase in this statistic in
case of partial retirement when both the social security wealth and the social security accrual are included.
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Table 2 Estimates of logistic hazard of entering retirement: full and partial retirement
Variable Full Partial Full Partial
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Table 2 continued
Variable Full Partial Full Partial
1a 1b 2a 2b
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SSWP has a positive impact on the hazard rate to partial retirement while a negative
one, that lessens over time, on the hazard rate to full retirement. The estimators all
have the expected sign and are statistically significant. An increase in SSW could be
interpreted as a wealth effect, so as an incentive to increase the consumption of
leisure, which requires retiring earlier. It is interesting to notice the negative sign
that each measure of SSW has on the alternative exit route. We could interpret this
finding in the following sense: if partial pensions are favoured, and hence SSWP is
increased, this will imply a reduction on the hazard rate to full retirement and a rise
on the hazard rate to partial retirement, other things equal.
With respect to the first incentive measure and for the case of full retirement,
SSAFaffects negatively the hazard rate to full retirement, as expected. The larger the
SSAF, the less the individual brings forward full retirement. It must be noted that the
negative impact of SSAF on the hazard rate to full retirement becomes positive at
65 years of age. That is, at the age of 65 the increase in SSWF one can obtain by
postponing 1 year full retirement has a positive impact on its own hazard rate. Even if
the postponement of full retirement is awarded through greater SSAF, there exists a
Table 3 Marginal effects on transition intensities and percentage of change in transition intensities
Age Marginal effects of Percentage of change
SSWF SSWP SSWF SSWP
Full Partial Full Partial Full Partial Full Partial
60 0.0181 -0.0037 -0.0085 0.0100 10.82 -14.15 -5.10 38.24
61 0.0058 -0.0020 -0.0022 0.0039 12.37 -20.03 -4.79 38.16
62 0.0059 -0.0021 -0.0021 0.0031 10.01 -21.40 -3.54 31.68
63 0.0053 -0.0013 -0.0018 0.0016 7.90 -25.00 -2.65 30.50
64 0.0073 -0.0004 -0.0021 0.0004 5.54 -27.21 -1.57 26.50
65 0.0066 -0.0003 -0.0016 0.0002 0.90 -27.71 -0.22 23.43
For computing marginal effects, we evaluate the marginal effects at every observation the sample average
of the individual marginal effects. The marginal effect is measured by the increment that each variable is
going to experiment if all pensions benefits increase in 10%, holding the rest of the variables constant
Table 2 continued
Variable Full Partial Full Partial
1a 1b 2a 2b
























Pseudo R2 0.3788 0.2459 0.3953 0.3093
Log likelihood -37,558 -8,317 -36,558 -7,618
t ratios in parentheses: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Monetary values
are in millions euros
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reluctance to remain in the labour market at the age of 65. In relation to the SSAP it
influences the hazard rate to partial retirement negatively, as expected.
Since the coefficients from a non-linear model do not have an immediate
interpretation in terms of magnitude, we provide in Table 3 the marginal effect that
each SSW has on transition intensities at each age. We evaluate the marginal effects
at every observation and use the sample average of the individual marginal effects.
We measure the marginal effect by the increment that each variable is going to
experiment if all pension benefits increase in 10%, holding the rest of the variables
constant. Due to the large differences in the magnitude of the hazard rates to the two
types of exit routes, it is necessary to evaluate these effects not only in absolute but
also in relative terms, therefore the percentage of change in transition intensities is
also reported. It can be seen in Table 3 that, for the same increment in pensions,
transition intensities to partial retirement are more responsive to its own SSW than
the corresponding ones to full retirement.




SSWF 6.0587 (23.17)*** -0.0640 (0.08)
SSWF 9 log Dur -2.1142 (9.55)*** -1.5787 (2.00)**
SSWP -6.9708 (53.81)*** 8.9898 (16.82)***
SSWP 9 log Dur 3.3444 (25.21)*** -1.6782 (3.11)***
s F 0.0443 (2.49)** 1.1359 (17.68)***
s F 9 log Dur -0.0675 (4.21)*** -0.3907 (7.29)***
s P -3.5433 (36.64)*** 3.4093 (19.72)***
s P 9 log Dur 0.9451 (5.22)*** -1.1618 (5.60)***
Pseudo R2 0.4062 0.2985




SSWF 1.1794 (3.74)*** -32.0198 (6.92)***
SSWF 9 log Dur 0.8109 (3.23)*** 14.1701 (4.99)***
SSWP -8.0679 (55.46)*** 37.7482 (8.78)***
SSWP 9 log Dur 4.0137 (27.97)*** -18.5031 (7.00)***
PVF 11.2700 (26.56)*** -29.7299 (7.19)***
PVF 9 log Dur 4.9053 (7.55)*** 17.8500 (5.07)***
PVP 129.8351 (36.03)*** -176.4623 (10.98)***
PVP 9 log Dur -49.6167 (5.23)*** -189.8836 (6.53)***
Pseudo R2 0.4234 0.2977
Log likelihood -34,860 -7,746
t ratios in parentheses: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Monetary values
are in millions euros
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Concerning the other regressors included in Table 2, and aside from social
security incentives, our results show that having a high level of education,
approximated by the job qualification, affects the hazard rate to both types of routes
negatively. Figures 5 and 6 illustrate this result. This is a recurrent finding in
empirical studies of retirement behaviour, as also found in Blanco (2000) where
individuals with a high qualification try to delay the date of retirement. It is surprising
the negative effect that perceiving a disability pension has on the hazard rate to both
types of risks. The explanation for this counterintuitive sign is the legislation itself,
which states that disability pensions will become retirement pensions once the
Table 6 Marginal effects of DSSW on transition intensities and percentage of change in transition
intensities
Age Marginal effects Percentage of change
Full Partial Full Partial
60 0.0144 -0.0140 8.63 -53.40
61 0.0037 -0.0038 7.85 -36.89
62 0.0027 -0.0018 4.57 -18.57
63 0.0016 -0.0005 2.35 -8.81
64 0.0009 0.0000 0.68 -2.34
For computing marginal effects, we evaluate the marginal effects at every observation and use the sample
average of the individual marginal effects. We measure the marginal effect by the decrease that DSSW is
going to suffer if reduction coefficients also affect pensions stemming from partial retirement before
reaching the age of 65
Table 5 Estimates of logistic hazard of entering retirement: full and partial retirement
Variable Full Partial Full Partial


































Pseudo R2 0.3592 0.2132 0.3702 0.3029
Log likelihood -38,742 -8,677 -38,077 -7,688
t ratios in parentheses: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Monetary values
are in millions euros
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beneficiaries turn 65 years of age.11 We finally notice which variables have a
differential impact on the hazard rates to both types of risks. In particular, both
perceiving an unemployment benefit and the number of years of contribution to the









































Fig. 4 Predicted hazard rate to partial retirement
11 If individuals who perceive disability pensions do not retire until they reach 65 the new pension
denomination does not imply any modifications to the pensions that have been received up to that point.
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system have a negative effect on the hazard rate to partial retirement while a positive
effect on the hazard rate to full retirement.
5.2 The impact of the implicit tax rate and the peak value
We proceed to analyze the impact of two more incentive measures, namely the
implicit tax rate on postponing retirement and the peak value, on the hazard of
entering retirement either fully or partially. Table 4 reports the estimates of the same
model as columns 2a and 2b in Table 2 but instead of using the social security accrual
we use the implicit tax rate in columns 1a and 1b and the peak value in columns 2a and
2b as incentive measures. Only the estimates for the social security measures are
presented given that no substantial changes are observed on the rest of variables.
With respect to the implicit tax/subsidy rate imposed by the social security system
we observe in columns 1a and 1b of Table 4 that both sF and sP have a significant
expected positive sign on their own hazard rate. However, in case of full retirement
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Fig. 6 Predicted hazard rate to partial retirement by level of education
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In relation to the peak value, we observe in columns 2a and 2b of Table 4 that
PVF has an unexpected positive sign to the hazard rate to full retirement while PVP
has the expected negative sign to the hazard rate to partial retirement. These findings
suggest that forward-looking measures of economic incentives do influence
retirement decisions but only in the case of partial retirement. So, full retirement
decisions could be postponed 1 year but no more than this. However, the
assumption that the maximum full retirement age allowed is 66 could reduce the
potential strength of the peak value as an incentive measure.
5.3 The impact of delta social security wealth
To properly evaluate how social security incentives affect the choice between
alternative retirement routes we study the impact that delta social security wealth has
on each hazard rate. Remember from Sect. 4.2 that this incentive measure provides
an assessment about how much partial retirement exceeds full retirement in terms of
SSW. Table 5 reports the results of the estimation where we only include as social
security incentives the DSSW and the SSA. As we can observe, the DSSW has the
expected sign and its coefficient is statistically significant. DSSW affects negatively
the hazard rate to full retirement and positively the hazard rate to partial retirement.
The finding that there is variation in the impact of the variable DSSW across risks
is important. One implication is that policies designed to increase the DSSW will
have the effect of increasing the hazard rate to partial retirement while decreasing
the hazard rate to full retirement.
In order to assess the magnitude of the effect of DSSW we use the estimation
results presented in columns 2a and 2b of Table 5 and imagine a counterfactual
scenario where partial pensions are subject to the application of reduction
coefficients in case the worker partially retires before reaching the age of 65. With
this hypothetical policy design we are eliminating one of the major appeals of partial
retirement legislation. We provide in Table 6 the marginal effects that DSSW has on
transition intensities at each duration. We again evaluate the marginal effects at every
observation and use the sample average of the individual marginal effects. We
measure the marginal effect by the decrease that DSSW is going to suffer if reduction
coefficients also affect pensions stemming from partial retirement before reaching
the ordinary age of retirement. Table 14 in Appendix presents descriptive statistics
for this relevant difference in DSSW. As we want to evaluate these effects not only in
absolute but also in relative terms, we include the percentage of change that
transition intensities will experiment at each age as a result of reducing DSSW. As it
can be seen in Table 6, the decreasing in the transition intensities to partial retirement
are quite substantial. The main effect is observed at the age of 60, the first time partial
retirement is allowed and the age when the application of reduction coefficients is
more severe. At this age, the probability to partially retire would be reduced by 50%
or more if partial pensions were penalized. Thus, the non-applicability of reduction
coefficients in case of partial retirement before the ordinary age of retirement is one
of the main determinants of the use of this figure.
To sum up, these results evidence that social security incentives do affect the
choice between the use of partial and full retirement as alternative routes to enter
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retirement. If partial retirement is favoured to the detriment of full retirement in
terms of increasing the variable DSSW, the selection of retirement routes by the
elderly will be influenced. Consequently, there is scope for policy intervention to
affect individual retirement decisions.
5.4 Estimating probabilities of second-best alternatives
In order to evaluate the impact of partial retirement legislation on the age of
retirement, we would like to know which is the second-best alternative for
individuals who partially retire, whether it is full retirement or continue in the labour
market.
Let us recover the exit indicators at t introduced in Sect. 3
YFt ¼ 1 T ¼ t; DF ¼ 1ð Þ
YPt ¼ 1 T ¼ t; DP ¼ 1ð Þ
and define YNRt = 1 - YPt - YFt as an indicator of no retirement at t. Following
Arellano and Zamarro (2007) and letting uj ¼ x0bj þ ej denote the net utility of
alternative j, where j = {F, P, NR}, the probability of alternative F as a second-
best, having alternative P as a first best at t, is in general
PrðuFt [ uNRtjuPt [ uNRt; uPt [ uFt; x; T  tÞ
¼ PrðuFt [ uNRtjx; T  tÞ  PrðYFt ¼ 1jx; T  tÞ
PrðYPt ¼ 1jx; T  tÞ
However, for multinomial logit this reduces to
PrðuFt [ uNRtjuPt [ uNRt; uPt [ uFt; x; T  tÞ
¼ PrðuFt [ uNRtjx; T  tÞ ¼ e
x0bF
1 þ ex0bF
As our objective is to obtain aggregate probabilities of having full retirement as a
second best alternative for individuals who choose partial retirement, we take into
account the distribution of characteristics given the retirement route chosen and
proceed in the following way for every t




1 þ ex0bF dFðxjYPt ¼ 1; T  tÞ
¼ 1




1 þ ex0bF PrðYPt ¼ 1jx; T  tÞdFðxÞ
or












In a restrictive partial equilibrium analysis, observing a value of Pr(uFt [ uNRt |
YPt = 1, T C t) close to one would imply that the partial retirement legislation does
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not create distortions in terms of bringing forward the age of retirement. If, on the
contrary, Pr(uFt [ uNRt | YPt = 1, T C t) is close to zero, partial retirement
legislation modifies the age of retirement, moving it to an earlier date.
Based on the estimated model from columns 2a and 2b of Table 2, Table 7
presents the estimates of the conditional probability of full retirement as a second-
best given partial retirement as the first best separately by ages. Given that in ages
ranging from 60 to 63 these probabilities are quite small, we have some evidence
that partial retirement legislation has modified the age of retirement, particularly
moving it forward. In other words, people who partially retire before the ordinary
age of retirement would prefer to continue in the labour market rather than entering
full retirement as a second-best option.
6 Conclusions
In several developed countries, the ageing process of the population and the
shortening of professional lifes may pose fiscal risks to the pay-as-you-go systems
of public pensions. For this reason, it is important to understand which factors
influence retirement decisions. This paper studies the determinants of two forms of
accessing pension benefits, partial and full retirement, by men in ages ranging from
60 to 65 in Spain. A multinomial logit duration model is estimated using the newly
released Continuous Sample of Working Histories (Muestra Continua de Vidas
Laborales). Different measures capturing the economic incentives of the social
security system are constructed with the objective of assessing their explanatory
power of retirement decisions. Special interest is devoted to know if partial
retirement legislation modifies retirement patterns.
The results show that social security legislation significantly influences
retirement behaviour. Thus, individuals seem to behave rationally and in the
expected direction to the economic incentives embedded in the social security
system. Both the social security wealth and related economic incentives used in the
analysis have a significant and in no way negligible effect on the hazard rate to the
two types of retirement routes.
Moreover, we find that partial retirement legislation affects the choice between
the use of partial and full retirement as alternative forms of accessing old-age
pensions. We also find that there is variation across risks in the impact of an
incentive variable measuring how much partial retirement beats full retirement in
terms of social security wealth. Our results support the idea that there is scope for
policy intervention to affect individual retirement decisions. The selection of
retirement routes by the elderly will be influenced if partial retirement is favoured to
the detriment of full retirement. In particular, the non-applicability of reduction
coefficients in case of partial retirement is one of the main determinants of the use of
this figure. In fact, we estimate that the probability to partially retire at the age of 60
would be reduced by 50% or more if partial pensions were penalized through
reduction coefficients.
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Furthermore, we have gathered evidence that partial retirement legislation has
modified the age of retirement, particularly moving it to an earlier date. Thus, partial
retirement is actually creating incentives to advance retirement.
Finally, the results of this paper illustrate that adequate policies to retain old
workers at work will only be appropriately formulated once the determinants of
retirement decisions are well understood. This paper represents a first attempt to
analyze partial retirement legislation in Spain, which can be enriched in different
ways. For example, partial retirement could be modelled following an equilibrium
search approach, with firms playing a central role. Moreover, partial retirement
decisions could be studied in a household framework. It would also be interesting to
consider partial retirement as the result of a joint decision: when partially retire and
when exiting completely the labour market through full retirement. Finally, the
interaction between the tax system and the social security incentives is certainly a
recommended topic for further research.
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Appendix: Data and variables
Definition of variables used in the empirical analysis:
• Personal characteristics:
• University educationi: Proxy for the level of education. Dummy variable that
takes the value 1 if the maximum contributory group achieved throughout
the worker’s career is the number 1, corresponding to engineers and
university graduates, according to the legislation. The poor reliability for the
educational attainment data obliged us to use a proxy for the level of
education using the information on the contributory group.
• Foreigni: Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the individual nationality
is not spanish.
• Disability pensionit: Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the individual
was perceiving a disability pension 1 year before each age.
• Contributory life characteristics:
• Unemployedit: Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the individual was
perceiving an unemployment benefit 1 year before each age.
• Number of SS relationsi: Total number of contributory labour relations
registered by the social security administration.
• Unique relationi: Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the individual had
a unique relation throughout the worker’s career.
• Number of years of contributionit: Total number of years of contribution to
the social security system at each age/duration. The time spent perceiving
unemployment benefits counts as contributive years towards an old-age
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pension as the INEM (Instituto de Empleo. Servicio Pu´blico de Empleo
Estatal) is contributing.
• Sector of activityi: Four categories for the sector of activity of the longest
contract throughout the worker’s career based on the contribution account
code that follows the national classification of economic activities (CNAE-
93).
• Agriculture and Fisheries: 01, 02 and 05.
• Industry: 10–37, 40 and 41.
• Construction: 45.
• Services: 50–52, 55, 60–67, 70–75, 80, 85, 90–93, 95 and 99.
• Social security regimei: Four categories for the social security regime of the
longest contract throughout the worker’s career: general system, self-
employed, special agricultural system and others.
Descriptive statistics for the different incentives measures used in the analysis:
see Tables 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14.
Table 8 Estimated monthly retirement pension amounts at entry at each age (in 01/2007 euros)
Age Retirement route Mean Std. Dev. p10 p50 p90
60 Full 772.53 317.54 461.31 673.41 1,266.69
Partial 1,010.79 461.46 458.83 930.35 1,711.25
Partial reduced 671.81 256.00 442.08 571.36 1,076.69
61 Full 869.66 373.58 472.34 775.86 1,444.18
Partial 1,026.50 459.03 477.24 947.41 1,735.25
Partial reduced 750.41 306.18 447.85 658.49 1227.55
62 Full 979.16 424.41 506.40 888.11 1,631.88
Partial 1,049.69 456.52 501.78 971.56 1,762.58
Partial reduced 839.45 352.71 457.17 753.91 1,387.10
63 Full 1,092.16 471.64 545.03 999.73 1,818.84
Partial 1,072.98 456.83 519.77 993.93 1,793.43
Partial reduced 933.03 395.11 486.11 848.69 1,546.01
64 Full 1,244.77 528.73 606.27 1,151.46 2,053.21
Partial 1,094.82 458.09 533.02 1,015.39 1,826.59
Partial reduced 1,027.93 434.14 516.40 943.28 1,702.70
65 Full 1,311.11 541.75 646.13 1,218.96 2,181.57
Partial 1,114.78 460.25 549.60 1,037.20 1,854.33
66 Full 1,332.19 542.59 667.04 1,242.17 2,207.49
Partial 1,132.47 460.99 567.54 1,056.59 1,876.23
The reduced partial pension corresponds to a counterfactual policy design where partial pensions are
subject to the application of reduction coefficients
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Table 10 Social security accrual (in 01/2007 euros)
Age Retirement route Mean Std. Dev. p10 p50 p90
60 Full 23,025 17,228 257 23,297 45,466
Partial 1,790 3,898 -2,375 1,579 6,219
61 Full 24,847 15,982 3,315 25,134 44,810
Partial 328 3,914 -4,123 184 4,757
62 Full 24,019 14,541 3,407 24,400 41,586
Partial -390 3,039 -4,098 -326 3,140
63 Full 31,313 20,966 3,359 28,190 61,825
Partial -1,312 2,349 -4,349 -1,080 1,301
64 Full 9,765 14,043 -7,300 9,911 26,837
Partial -2,086 1,743 -4,736 -1,834 -256
65 Full -479 9,872 -10,914 -555 11,066
Partial -2,616 1,304 -4,617 -2,429 -1,145
Table 9 Social security wealth (in 01/2007 euros)
Age Retirement route Mean Std. Dev. p10 p50 p90
60 Full 205,422 84,082 123,771 179,336 334,840
Partial 326,224 134,673 160,889 301,281 537,070
61 Full 221,346 94,689 121,407 198,055 365,254
Partial 318,235 130,774 148,430 294,905 523,816
62 Full 238,724 103,105 123,285 216,460 395,152
Partial 309,324 126,545 153,671 287,873 508,973
63 Full 254,907 109,748 127,708 233,447 422,722
Partial 300,217 122,487 149,423 279,988 494,778
64 Full 278,238 118,266 134,032 257,632 457,519
Partial 291,045 118,542 144,418 271,944 480,399
65 Full 280,298 115,643 137,503 261,042 464,895
Partial 281,777 114,673 140,099 263,612 465,723
66 Full 272,549 110,921 135,906 254,855 450,931
Partial 272,549 110,921 135,906 254,855 450,931
Table 11 The implicit tax/subsidy imposed by the social security system
Age Retirement route Mean Std. Dev. p10 p50 p90
60 Full -1.1177 0.9135 -1.9933 -1.1406 - 0.0219
Partial -0.1196 0.3082 -0.3618 -0.0929 0.1210
61 Full -1.3298 1.0890 -2.4488 -1.1799 -0.2708
Partial -0.0448 0.3262 -0.2942 -0.0102 0.1873
62 Full -1.3362 1.0742 -2.6061 -1.1345 -0.3518
Partial 0.0079 0.2442 -0.1841 0.0188 0.1940
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Table 11 continued
Age Retirement route Mean Std. Dev. p10 p50 p90
63 Full -1.7910 1.6026 -3.6140 -1.3203 -0.4218
Partial 0.0689 0.1803 -0.0735 0.0636 0.2124
64 Full -0.5924 0.9298 -1.4476 -0.7088 0.3268
Partial 0.1176 0.1247 0.0163 0.1054 0.2271
65 Full 0.0140 0.8263 -0.5866 0.0343 0.6527
Partial 0.1495 0.0774 0.0845 0.1364 0.2354
Table 12 The peak value (in 01/2007 euros)
Age Retirement route Mean Std. Dev. p10 p50 p90
60 Full 123,890 63,633 27,311 128,279 203,954
Partial 4,691 7,804 -2,020 2,556 14,580
61 Full 98,289 50,196 23,319 99,741 164,729
Partial 1,680 6,001 -4,074 484 9,030
62 Full 71,639 36,882 19,423 70,948 121,259
Partial 50 3,829 -4,085 -267 4,468
63 Full 46,352 24,923 15,321 44,211 80,600
Partial -1,233 2,513 -4,349 -1,071 1,452
64 Full 13,106 15,661 -6,017 12,476 32,361
Partial -2,082 1,756 -4,736 -1,834 -256
65 Full -479 9,872 -10,914 -555 11,066
Partial -2,616 1,304 -4,617 -2,429 -1,145
Table 13 Delta social security wealth (in 01/2007 euros)
Age Mean Std. Dev. p10 p50 p90
60 122,592 62,063 30,296 125,282 202,173
61 98,651 48,964 25,693 100,693 162,425
62 72,214 36,754 21,245 72,503 121,331
63 46,650 26,143 17,156 44,949 82,478
64 14,069 17,440 -7,303 14,034 35,376
65 2,137 9,177 -7,403 1,882 13,208
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